Finanskrisen kort fortalt (Kan 2024)
Finanskrisen i 2007–08, også kalt subprime-pantekrise, alvorlig sammentrekning av likviditet i globale finansmarkeder som oppsto i USA som et resultat av det amerikanske boligmarkedets kollaps. Den truet med å ødelegge det internasjonale finanssystemet; forårsaket svikt (eller nesten svikt) hos flere større investerings- og forretningsbanker, pantelångivere, forsikringsselskaper og spareforening; og presipiterte den store resesjonen (2007–09), den verste økonomiske nedgangen siden den store depresjonen (1929 - ca. 1939).
Årsaker til krisen
Selv om de eksakte årsakene til finanskrisen er et spørsmål om uenighet blant økonomer, er det generell enighet om faktorene som spilte en rolle (eksperter er uenige om deres relative betydning).
For det første reduserte Federal Reserve (Fed), USAs sentralbank, etter å ha forutsett en mild nedgang som begynte i 2001, den føderale rentesatsen (renten som bankene belaster hverandre for utlån over natten til føderale fond — dvs. mellomværende i en bank i Federal Reserve) 11 ganger mellom mai 2000 og desember 2001, fra 6,5 prosent til 1,75 prosent. Den betydelige reduksjonen gjorde det mulig for bankene å utvide konsumkreditt til en lavere prime rate (renten som bankene belaster deres "prime" eller lave risiko kunder, vanligvis tre prosentpoeng over den føderale renten) og oppmuntret dem til å låne ut til "subprime" eller kunder med høy risiko, men til høyere renter (se utlån til subprime). Forbrukerne benyttet seg av billig kreditt til å kjøpe varige varer som apparater, biler og spesielt hus.Resultatet var etableringen på slutten av 1990-tallet av en "boligboble" (en rask økning i boligprisene til nivåer langt utover deres grunnleggende eller iboende verdi, drevet av overdreven spekulasjon).
Second, owing to changes in banking laws beginning in the 1980s, banks were able to offer to subprime customers mortgage loans that were structured with balloon payments (unusually large payments that are due at or near the end of a loan period) or adjustable interest rates (rates that remain fixed at relatively low levels for an initial period and float, generally with the federal funds rate, thereafter). As long as home prices continued to increase, subprime borrowers could protect themselves against high mortgage payments by refinancing, borrowing against the increased value of their homes, or selling their homes at a profit and paying off their mortgages. In the case of default, banks could repossess the property and sell it for more than the amount of the original loan. Subprime lending thus represented a lucrative investment for many banks. Accordingly, many banks aggressively marketed subprime loans to customers with poor credit or few assets, knowing that those borrowers could not afford to repay the loans and often misleading them about the risks involved. As a result, the share of subprime mortgages among all home loans increased from about 2.5 percent to nearly 15 percent per year from the late 1990s to 2004–07.
Third, contributing to the growth of subprime lending was the widespread practice of securitization, whereby banks bundled together hundreds or even thousands of subprime mortgages and other, less-risky forms of consumer debt and sold them (or pieces of them) in capital markets as securities (bonds) to other banks and investors, including hedge funds and pension funds. Bonds consisting primarily of mortgages became known as mortgage-backed securities, or MBSs, which entitled their purchasers to a share of the interest and principal payments on the underlying loans. Selling subprime mortgages as MBSs was considered a good way for banks to increase their liquidity and reduce their exposure to risky loans, while purchasing MBSs was viewed as a good way for banks and investors to diversify their portfolios and earn money. As home prices continued their meteoric rise through the early 2000s, MBSs became widely popular, and their prices in capital markets increased accordingly.
Fourth, in 1999 the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act (1933) was partially repealed, allowing banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to enter each other’s markets and to merge, resulting in the formation of banks that were “too big to fail” (i.e., so big that their failure would threaten to undermine the entire financial system). In addition, in 2004 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) weakened the net-capital requirement (the ratio of capital, or assets, to debt, or liabilities, that banks are required to maintain as a safeguard against insolvency), which encouraged banks to invest even more money into MBSs. Although the SEC’s decision resulted in enormous profits for banks, it also exposed their portfolios to significant risk, because the asset value of MBSs was implicitly premised on the continuation of the housing bubble.
Fifth, and finally, the long period of global economic stability and growth that immediately preceded the crisis, beginning in the mid- to late 1980s and since known as the “Great Moderation,” had convinced many U.S. banking executives, government officials, and economists that extreme economic volatility was a thing of the past. That confident attitude—together with an ideological climate emphasizing deregulation and the ability of financial firms to police themselves—led almost all of them to ignore or discount clear signs of an impending crisis and, in the case of bankers, to continue reckless lending, borrowing, and securitization practices.
